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ADDRESS DELIVERED BY JESSE W 0 CARTER BEFORE THE LA WYERS f CLUB
OF SAN FRANCISCO ON FEBRUARY THE 10TH, 1954, IN THE COMSTOCK
ROOM OF THE PALACE HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ENTITLED
"RECENT TREND IN COURT DECISIONS IN CALIFORNIAo "
Ninety-six years ago Justice Stephen J. Field, then
a member of the Supreme Court of California, in his dissenting
opinion in Ex parte Newman, 9 Gal.
502, 
at page 526, said:
"The law is a science, whose leading principles are settled.
They are not to be opened for discussion upon the elevation to
the bench of every new Judge, however subtle his intellect, or
proround his learning, or logical his reasoning. Upon their
stability men rest their property, make their contracts, assert
their rights, and claim protection. It 15 true that the law is
founded upon reason, but by this Is meant that it Is the l~esult
learning, and experience of mankind,of the general intelligence,
through a long succession of years, and not of the 1ndividual
It 1s poss1..blereasoning of one or of several judges.
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that some intellects may rise to the percept10n of absolute 
truth, and be justified in questioning the general judgment of 
the learned of mankind. But before the legitimate and just 
inference arising from the general acquiescence of' the learned 
can be avoided, the error in the principles recognized should 
be clearly shown. We should not blindly adhere to precedents, 
nor should we more blindly abandon them as guides." 
thought expressed by Justice Field in the 
foregoing excerpt was epitomized by Lord Hardwicke nearly 200 
years ago in these words: "Certainty is the mother of repose; 
therefore, the law aims at certainty. 
If these concepts were dominant in the format1on of 
court deciSions there would obviously be more unanim1ty and less 
conflicts, and there would be no occaSion to talk about trends 
1n court decisions. But judges are human beings and their 
thinking is influenced by their backgrounds of education, train1ng and 
associations, past and present. It cannot_ be denied that these 
are times of conflicting SOCial, economic and political 
, and the t philosophies is t not only 
the exeoutive and legislative of our government but by 
the judicial branch as well. We quite orten hear the words "liberal." 
"conservative," flreactionary/l" ttmlddle-ot-the-road,ft "left," "right. 1t 
These terms are all as equally applicable to JUdges as they are to 
those in the executive and legislative branches of our government. 
Who answers a partloular deSignation may 
conflict but there seems to be pretty 
the subject of SOme 
agreement in their 
application. Holmes was said to be a liberal in civil rights cases 
and in cases involving the right of the people through their 
legislatures to experiment In attemptlng to solve social and 
economic ills, and many of h1.8 greatest dissents \'lere In these 
fields, while in some other fields he was considered a conservatlve. 
S cudents of history recogn'.ze that the trend of court 
decisions is influenced by the polnt of view of the majority on the 
major Issues of the times. The number and character of the dissents 
depend upon the abilit¥l-_convlctlons and industry of the minority. 
In some of my dissents, I have referred to the trend of deciSion of 
the Supreme C'Jurt of Californla during the last few years. 
this trend bas decidedly reactionary. 
This statement is made advisedly and is based upon numerous 
recent decisions rendered by a majority of the Supreme Court of 
California in which the court has. by a non-liberal construction 
of the Constitution and laws of this state, denied lit1gants 
rights to which they were ent1tled. 
To be more specific. the Supreme Court of California 
has by a series of decisions during the past two or three years 
stricken down the remedial provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act designed to protect employees who suffer 
industrial injuries as a result of the ser10us and w1lful 
misconduct of their employers. I recently stated 1n one of cay 
dissents in these cases that by its recent decisions in this 
field the Supreme Court of California had wiped out forty years 
of progress in nullIfying, by interpretation, a statute which 
was designed to bring social justice to the working men and 
women of'this state.. Iamona of· those who can remember the 
plight of the injured workman before the Workmen's Compensat1on 
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Act was adopted. It is now a matter of h1story that the ad9Pt1on 
of the Act by of Californla was J fought 
by employer groups, and after its adoption it ran the gamut of 
adverse court decisions for many years. It might be of interest 
at this pOint to quote from the biennial message of Governor 
Hiram W. Johnsonl to the Legislature of California in 1917 1n 
which he reviewed the incidents leading up to the adoption and 
early period of the operation of th1s Act. He sald: tiThe new 
philosophy of government, which has obtained in Californ1a had 
its best and most sharply defined demonstrat1on 1n the workmen's 
compensat1on law. In 1911, we stood at the threshold of a great 
unexplored governmental field. Behind us were the hum1l1atl~n 
and shame of thirty years of exploited governmen~, cyn1cally 
adm1nistered for a few. With hope in democracy renewed by the 
first experience with the direct primary, with undefined, yet 
certain knowledge of democracy's obligations, we turned ~rom the 
old sordid materialism, and looked ~ the greater promise of 
1 1917 senate Journal 14 at 19, et seq. 
~-
actIvIty for humanIty itself. We entered falteringly 
unexplored field l and then.our steps grew firm and our vision 
broad, and today no commonwealth has gone farther or built 
better for humanity. 
"Those who believed that industry should bear the 
burd~n of its accidents, that its maimed and its injured should 
not be cast forever upon the scrap heap of humanity, were 
tirelessly seeking a legal remedy. It was realized that the 
frightful burden of accident should not be wholly upon 
least able to bear it, but the path to relief through the 
intricate mazes of the law was d1ff1cult to find. The legislature 
of 1911 adopted an elective law which, though not wholly effective 
afforded opportunity for an educational propaganda and a thorough 
investigation. 
"The first Industrial Accident CommisSion, consisting 
of A. J. P1llsbury, Will J. French and Willis I. Morrison, 
prepared an e1ahorateworkmen's compensation law which was 
presented to the legislature 1n 1913, was duly adopted, and 
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became operative January 1, 1914. While this law was pending 
and before it had undergone the actual test of administration, 
it was the center ot perhaps the bitterest contest that has 
been waged over any enactment of recent years. And out of all 
the bitterness and abuse and denunciation of that contest which may 
come to you who are now assuming legislative duties, is the 
lesson that must ever be learned by him who would fearlessly 
represent those who have entrusted him with power. Every day, 
during the session of 1913, all those newspapers of the State 
ot California which have ever been opposed to any sort of 
social justice, published page after page, not alone of 
so-called conservatIve argument against the 'corroding 
socialIsm' ot the state government, but of the foulest abuse of 
every Indiv1dual advocating the law. To pub11c scorn and 
ridicule and contumely we were held up as 'destroyers ot industry, 
'looters of bus1ness,' 'tra1tors to the state,' 'arrant demagogues 
panderIng to the worst ~l~ments of 0~~Q!t1~ensh~pt The 
law nevertheless passed. Six months after it had been operating, 
_7 ... 
we had the satisfaction of listening to the leaders of labor
and the representatives o£ the largest employers in the state
of California, united in a public gathering in universal praise
ot" the act.
Today, 
employer and the employee a11ke join in
c mmendation.
No man in public life would have the
temerity to suggest the repeal of the Workmen's Compensation
Law, and this law has been the vindication and the justification
of California's social program.
"In order to preclude the possibility of adverse
decisions by the courts, certain provisions of the law will
probably have to be re-enacted, and the amendments in this
regard will be presented to you by the commission." While I
think I am safe in saying that no one in public life today
would advocate the repeal of the Workmen's Compensation Act#
and the tendency of the Legislature has been to extend and
liberalize ita provisions, some of the recent decisions of the
2Supreme Court or Cal1fornia have h~4 the ~tr~~t Qt d~~troy1ng
2 Hawaiian Pineapple co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 40 Calo2d
656; Mercer-Fraser Coo Vo Industrial Acco Como, 40 Ca102d 102;
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or drastically curtailing the benefits which the provisions or
the Act were designed to confer upon the injured employees.
This has been true notwithstanding the express mandatory provisions
or the Act imposing upon the courts the duty of liberal
construction to the end that the bene~its Bought to be conferred
on injured employees will be obtained by them.
Another field in which the trend or decision by the
Supreme Court of California in recent years has been ultra-
conservative is in negligence cases where the court has# in
numerous cases, deprived the parties or the right of trial by
jury by holding, as a matter of law, that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain a verdict reached by th~ jury.
This
conclusion has been reached. in many cases where the verdict of
Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 40 Cal.2d 139; cal.-,
Western etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Calo2d 104; i
Fireman's Fund etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Cal.2d 529;
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Cal.2d 512; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 38 Cal.2d 599; California-
Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 38 Cal.2d 880;Bryant 
v. Industrial Acc. Com., 37 Ca1o2d 215; Cal~ ShipbuildingCorp. 
v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 31 Calo2d 278; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.
v. Ind. Acc. Com., 30 Ca1o2d 388; Pacific Freight Lines v. Ind.




It has been my position in each of" these cases that
when an 1ssue of fact 1s submitted to a jury, its decision
th reon. 
in the absence of prejudicial error in the admissio~
should be final. I can see no escape from this rule if the
constitutional provision that "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate" is to be upheld.
Until the last rew years the traditional rule in this
state was that only in cases where the uncontradicted evidence
was such that reasonable minds could not differ that the issues
of negligence and contributory negligence might be decided as
issues of law. In many recent cases.3 the Supreme Court of
3 Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290; Hawaiian
Pineapple Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.. 40 Cal.2d 656; Better Food
Mktso v. Amer. Dist. Teleg.Co., 40 Cal.2d 179; Atkinson v.
Pacific. Fire Extinguisher Co.~ 40 Cal.2d L92;- Sutter Butte Cana.l
Coo v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 40 Cal.2d 139; Mercer-Fraser Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Ca1o2d 102j Gill v. Hearst Publishing!COe, 
40 Calo2d 224; Goodman Ve Harris, 40 Calo2d 254j Pirkle Ve
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California has ignored th1s rule by the s1mple process of 
arbitrar1ly disregarding the determInation ot the tr1er of fact 
and ho1dlng~ as a matter of law, that the evIdence supporting 
such determination was insuff1cient. In one recent case (Gray 
v. Brinkerhoff, 41 A.C. 183), however, the major1ty cited the 
cases wh1ch established the reasonable minds rule and then 
m1sstated the rule and refused to apply the correct rule to the 
case. In that case the major1ty stated: "Whether or not 
defendant was gu11ty of neg11gence or plaintiff was guilty of 
• 
contributory negligence is ordinarily a questIon of mixed fact 
and law and may be determined as a matter of law only if 
reasonable men followin~ the law can draw but one conclusion 
from the evIdence presented." (EmphasIs addedo) In that case, 
the majority reversed a unanimous jury verd1ct approved by the 
trial court on a motion for a new trial and affirmed by a 
oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Ca1.2d 207; Burtis v. 
Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 40 Ca1.2d 823; Kurlan v. Columb1a 
Broadcasting System. 40 Cal.2d799;· \oJeitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 
C~lo2d 778; Turner v. Mellon, 41 A.C. 44; Barrett v. City of 
Claremont, 41 A.C. 69; Estate of Llng~nfelter, 38 Calo2d 5710 
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ion trict Court ot 
reversal was on the sole ground of of the 
evidence to aupport the verdict. The undeniable implication of 
this decision 18 that the twelve Jurors, the trial judge and the 
three members of the distr1ct court, as well as I, who did not 
agree with the majority, could not be classified as "reasonable 
men following the law." In other words, the view of the majority 
was that they themselves were the only "reasonable men follow1ng 
the law" who had participated in that case. In this case I 
might add that the verdict was in favor of the defendant. 
I was engaged 1n the active pract1ce of law for over 
twenty-six years before I became a member of the Supreme Cour~ 
of California. I participated in the trial of over a thousand 
cases; over three hundred of these cases reached·the appellate 
or Supreme Court on appeal and in none of these cases was a 
decision of the appellate or Supreme Court based on the 
insufflclency of the evidence to support the deciaion of the 
trial court or jury. In those days lawyers felt, and had a 
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right 
to reel, that when issues of fact \iere determined by the
trial court, or jury, and the case was appealed, the factual
determination by the trier o£ £act would be accepted by the
appellate court. While there may have been cases in those days
in which this rule was violated by the Supreme Court, or a
District Court of Appeal, they were few and far between. Now
the exceptIon has become the rule as I have In mInd no less than
fifteen cases in which the Supreme Court has decided the factual
issues 
contrary to the trial court or jury in the last two years.
It goes without saying that I dissented in each of these cases.
Ir there is any proposition that should be settled in
this state it should be the oft-repe8.ted rule that it 1s the
function of" an appellate court, in reviewing the evidence, to
resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent and that all
legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged to uphold
the verdict and that when a verdict 1s attacked as being
the power~oi'an appellate courtUnSUpP-Qr ted b~ the -evidence ~
begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
-13-
, or UrllColnt r .. u. f~' 
of t. I 
maintain that has been ruthle8s1~ by a 
majority of the Supreme of California in many recent 
decisions. In my opinion this trend ot decision not only 
not advance the science of jurisprudence or aid in the 
administration of Justice but a serious impediment to 
these objectives. Aside from the inabilIty of an appellate 
court to determine from the cold record the credibility of 
witnesses or the weight of the evidence, it has the effect of 
placing an undue burden on the members of the Supreme Court 
whose sole duty 1s to decide questions of law based upon the 
factual determination of the trier of fact 
In a book entitled "Trial Judge," by Justice Bernard 
of 
Botein (Simon & Schuster, 1952), the author states at page 131: 
"A major reason for a trial judge'S concern about his 
decLal_ona J.n _nQnjuryproc.eedings is tha-t an appellate court 
will rarely disturb his determination of the factso ThIs 
stamps the trial jud.ge's with a • 
"The the , which 
of ot the unsound .. 
final packaging ot the remaining ingredients at the ot 
trial court production line, are almost exclusively the 
funct10n of the tr1al judge or jury. The package may be labeled 
judgment for plaintiff or defendant. 
"Seldom mayan te court change or such 
f1nd1ngs. It may dec1de that on the facts as found 1n the 
tr1al court, the law was misapplied or m1sunderstood, so that 
the verd1ct or decision went tn favor ot the wrong • In 
that event they may say, 'We've looked into the package and 
th1nk you've put the wrong label on it. We won't d1sturb the 
contents ot your package, but we're go1ng to change the label 
so that it will read 1n favor ot the other party.' 
"The appellate court may also decide that the trial 
judge adm1tted improper ev1dence or excluded-proper evidence 
or that he instructed the jury erroneously. Then it may 
-15-
i reverse the verdict or decision, and send the case back to b~ 
tr1ed anew. It then says 1n effect to the trial court# qWe 
have ot , and that1t 
contains certa1n harmful substances.' Or, 'We f1nd that you 
out certaIn IngredIents which, 1n publio 
feel should have been included to ensure the pur1ty of your 
product. We are 
that you process it once more, in accordance w1th the formula 
we are now giving you. i " 
Another respect in which recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court of California have retarded the administration of 
justice 1s by curtailing the po\,ler of a trial Judge 1n granti*1! 
a mot1on for a new trial on limited issues. For many years 
sect10n 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure has provided that 
the trial court may grant a mot1on for a new trial on part of 
the 1ssues onlYG Up until about a year and a half ago most o~ 
trial Judge had the power to grant a motion for a 
new trial on the issue of damages only in 
16-
a personal injury action whsre the damages awarded were either
excessive or inadequate and that his ruling would not be
disturbed in the absence of a gross, manifest and unmistakable
abuse or d1scret1on.4 The same rule was applied to such an order
as to an order granting a new trial on the insufficiency of the
But in August or 1952 the Supreme Court or California
evidence.
held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
grant a new trial in a personal injury action on the issue of
4 Hicks v. Ocean Shore Railroad, Inc. 18 Calo2d 773
[117 P.2d 850]; Estate of Everts, 163 Cal. 449 t125 P. 1059];
Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217 [148 P.2d 680]; People ex
rel. Dept. of Public Works v. McCullough~ 100 CaloApPo2d 101
(223 P.2d 37]; Ona v. Reachi~ 105 Cal.App.2d 758 [233 P.2d 949];
County of Los Angeles vo Bitterg 103 Cal.A~p.2d 385 [229 P02d
466]; Perry vo Fowler, 102 Ca10App.2d 808 l229 P.2d 46]; Parka
v. Dexter, 100 Cal.App.2d 521 [224 P.2d 121]; J. Levin Co. v.
Sherwood & Sherwood, 55 CaloApp. 308 [203 P. 404]; Rigal1 Vo
I~ew1B, 1 Cal~App.2d 737 [37 P.2d 97]; Spencer V. Nelson. 84
Cal.App.2d 61 [ 190 P.2d 40]; Wold v. League of the Cross. 107
Cal.App. 344 [290 Po 460); Amore v. Di Resta, 125 Cal.Appo
410 [13 P.2d 986]; Johnstone v. Johnson, 38 CaloAp~o2d 700 [102
P.2d 374]; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal.ApPo2d 117 (124 P.2d80). 
Crandall v. McGrath, 51 Cal.App.2d 438 [124 P.2d 858);
Bauman v. San Francisco. 42 Cal.App.2d 144 [108 P.2d 989];
Pacific Telo & Telo Co. v. Wellman, 98 CaloApp.2d 151 [219 P.2d
506]; TUmelty v. Peerless Stagps, 96 CaloApp. 530 [~4 P. 430];
Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises Inc., 49 Cal.ApPo2d 383 [121
P.2d 829]; McNear v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 03 Cal.App.2d
11 [146 P.2d 34); Henslee v. Fox, 25 Ca1.App.2d 286 [77 P.2d
307); ~e11er v. Reid, 26 CaloApp.2d 421 [79 P.2d 449]; Martin
v. Donohue, 30 Ca1.APPo2d 219 [85 P.2d 913]; Ohran Vo Yolo
County. 40 CaloApp.2d 298 [104 P.2d 700]; Tomell 'vo Munson,
80 Ca1.APPo2d 123 [181 Po2d 112}; Woods v. Eitze. 94 Cal.ApPo2d
910 [212 P.2d 12]; Tripcevich Vo Compton. 25 CaloApPo2d 188
[77 Po2d 286]0
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damages only where the damages awarded by a JU~J were 
inadequate 0 5 This holding was made in four personal inju~J 
cases where the evIdence both as to liability and damages was 
conf11ct1ngo The theory of the majorIty opinions in these 
cases seemed to be that the jury compromised the issue of 
liabil1ty 1n favor of the plaInt1ff w1th the understanding that 
a small amount of damages would be awarded, and that it ~iaS 
therefore unjust to the defendant for the case to be retried 
on the issue of damages onlyo In one of these cases the court 
squarely held that the Issues of liabIlity and damages were so 
1nterwoven that a just conclus1on could not be reached with 
respect to the Issue of damages w1thout retryIng the issue of 
l1ab111tyo Th1s holding was clearly contrary to the holding of 
th1s same Supreme Court in Fuentes Vo Tucker, 31 Calo2d 1, 
decided in 1947~ where it was held that the issues of liability 
and damages 1n personal injury actions were entIrely separate 
5 Leipert Va Honold, 39 Calo2d 462; Rose Vo Melody 
Lane, 39 Cal02d 481; Cary Vo Wentzel, 39 Calo2d 491; Hamasaki 
Va Flotho, 39 Calo2d 6020 
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t liabilIty i8 by 
it is eI-l!"Ol!" to lIabilIty over 
defendant's objectIon. 
There can be no tion but that the effect ot the 
holdIng ot the SupI"eme Court the Leipert~ Rose, 
HamasakI cases is to depI-ive the trial COUI-t ot poweI- to gI-ant 
a new trial in a personal Injury actIon on' 
only, where the damages awarded by the jury are obviously 
inadequate, and to require a re-trial on allot the issues even 
though it is obvious to the trial court and to everyone 
connected with the case that there is little or no doubt as t9 
the lIabilIty of the defendant. Thus. so far as this type of 
case is concerned. the salutary provision authorizing 
granting of a new trial on a part of the issues only is a 
nullity. It is obvious that by this provision the Legislature 
sought to make it possible to facilitate the disposition of 
cases of this charac ter and thus save the time of the- court and, 
the expense and burden to litigants which necessarily results 
-19-
protracted tr1also Certainly the trial judge who sees the
witnesses# hears the testimony and observes its effect upon the
1s in a better position to say whether the amount of the
verdict was affected by the evidence as to liability than an
appellate court which has only the printed record before ito I
therefore say that the obvious effect of the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of California in this field is to retard
and obstruct the administration of justice.
A few years ago the Supreme Court or Ca11rorn1a held
that a married woman was barred from recovering for her personal
injuries by the contributory negligence of her husband Zaragosa
Craven, 33 Cal~2d 315) because the recovery
would 
be
community property under the law of California and her husband
In tha twould thereby profit from the result of hie own wrong.
case I dissented and the Legislature, at the following session,
attempted to overcome the effect of the majority decision
(Civil Code$ § 171 c). Th13 amendment has no-t- been interpreted
by the Supreme Court, but the case of Zaragosa v. Craven has
-20-
been widely criticized by text writers and courts ot other
states.
In 1952. a case involving this question came before the
Supreme court o£ New Mexico (245 P.2d 826).
Arter 
rererrlng to
the Zaragosa case. the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to
follow it and concluded its opinion saying "We are ot the
opinion that reason, justice and a fair interpretation of our
community statute. construed either in the light or the common
or Spanish law, require that we hold the cause or action for the
pers~nal injury to the wife» and for the resultant pain and
u£f ring. 
belongs to the wife, and that the judgment and its
proceeds are her separate property. She brought her body to
the marriage and on its dissolution is entitled to take it away;
she is similarly entitled to compensation from one who has
wrongfully violated her right to personal security. It any
writer has ever said a kind word for the majority holding [in
the Zaragosa case]. it has escaped our notlceo
"Under the majority doctrine. if the wife were riding
a horse she had brought to the marriage and some driver of a
-21-
motor 
vehicle negligently struck her and the horse, throwing
both into a wire fence, breaking the leg of each and also
disfiguring them.. the cause or action ror the damage to the
horse would belong to the wire. but that ror the injury to her
would belong to the community and the husband would receive one
half of the proceeds of a judgment. In addition" the husband
could, 
ir he desired, refuse to bring suit ror the injuries
the wife had sustalnedo We decline to adopt such a rule in
New Mexico. It seemed to me at the time the Zaragosa case was
deci ed. 
and I am still of the same view. that the majority




any reasonable interpretation of the law or
consideration ot justice and I am pleased to know that this
view has been accepted in some of the other jurisdictione where
community property law prevails.
the Supreme Court of CaliforniaIn civil rights cases,
has nullified the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and section 19 of article I of the Constitution
-22-
iof California by holding that evidence obtained in violation or
these provisions Is competent and admissible in the courts of
this state. The effect of this holding 1s to abrogate the
right of privacy in California. This great right is expressed
in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitut1on of the Un1ted states,
and it reads as rollows: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses. papers~ and effects, against
unreasonable eearches and seizures. shall not be violated. and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched.. and the persons 01' things to be seized." This
exact provision 1.8 round in the Constitution or our state in
section 19, article I.
.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through
many great judges and in a great number of cases, has staunchly
refused to allow this right to be violated. In the highest
court or. our country.. the protection extends even further than
the literal words o~ the Amendmento No evidence obtained in
violation thereof may be used against a defendant in the
federal courts.
In California, due to an unfortunate line of decisions,
evidence illegally obtained is admissible in the courts. With
(Seethese holdings I have always been in d~sagreement.
dissenting opinion in People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 140,
reversed by United States Supreme Court, Rochin v. Cali~ornia,
342 u.s. 165.) I have always taken the position that the
decisions of the Supreme Court of California have given aid
comfort to so-called officers of the law who are so lacking in
respect fo'r the constitutional provisions here involved that
they ruthlessly violate them with 1mpunityo To them the
constitutional right of privacy does not exist, and they make an
empty, hollow mockery out of the oath which they took to support
th'L' Constitution.
Under the law of this state any police offIcer may
pre~k into any ho~e.. seize anything he may deBlre and thls- may
be used against a defendant despite the fact that no warrant
-24-
been issued, and that the breaking and entering may have beek 
done on mere suspicion or conjecture. These constitutional 
provis10ns were adopted to prevent this very evil. 
It is indeed regrettable that the majority ot the 
Supreme Court of California has seen fit to perpetuate a rule 
which permits peace officers to flout these constitutional 
mandates. This rule was first pronounced by the Supreme Court 
of California in People Vo Mayen, 188 Cal. 237. which was 
followed by the cases of People v. Gonzales, 20 Calo2d 165, and 
People v. Kelley. 22 Calo2d 1690 Abuses which have been 
practiced under this rule have been declared by the Supreme 
I 
Court of the United states to be of such gravIty and so Inhu~n 
as to shock the conscience of mankind and that "this course of 
proceeding by agents of government to obtain ev1dence is bound 
to offend even hardened sensibIlities." (See Rochin Vo 
California, 342 U.So 1~5o) While the reversal of the Supreme 
Court of CalIfornIa by the Supreme Court of- the United states 
in the Rochln case was not based upon the Fourth Amendment to 
-25-
ConstItut1on but upon 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to that 
Constitution, it cannot be denied that had the courts of 
Calitornia the federal rule wIth respect to excluding 
evidence obtained as the result ot an unlawful search and 
seizure, the Rochin case would never have occurredo 
It cannot be denied that lt lles within the power of 
a maJorlty of the Supreme Court of California to change the 
rule whlch permitted and encouraged the shocking and inhuman 
conduct ot peace officers depicted in the Rochln case. The 
courts of last resort of many other states have seen flt to 
adopt and follow the federal rule relatlng to the admlaSibili~Y 
of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and 
selzure. 
On December 6, 1950, the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
in the case of Rickards v. state, overruled two prior decisions 
ot that court and adopted the federal rule with respect to the 
inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful 
-26-
search and seizure; that is, search without a search warrant 
decision or the Supreme Court of Delaware is reported in 77 
A.2d at page 199. In the course of its op1nion in this case, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware stated: 
"Courts rollowing the Federal rule adopt the view that 
the efficient prosecution or crindnals cannot justiry a deliberate 
invasion ot the rIght of the citizen to be made secure against 
violation of specific constitutional guarantees, and that 
the suggested remedy of a civil action is as a practical matter 
no remedy at allo The Federal rule 1s a practical attempt to 
help preserve the constitutional guarantees 
"We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts. We 
conceive it the duty of the courts to protect constitutional 
guarantees. The most effective way to protect the guarantees 
against unreasonable search and seizure and compulsory self-
incrimination is to exclude trom evidence any matter obtained 
by a violation of them 
t'\ie believe that as long as the Constitution of this 
-'2:7-
state contains the guarantees to the citizen referred tO
I 
we 
have no choice but to use every means at our disposal to preserve 
those guaranteeso Since it 1s obvious that the exclusion of 
such matters from evidence is the most practical protection~ we 
adopt that means. It is no answer to say that the rule hampers 
the task ot the prosecuting officer. If forced to choose between 
convenience to the prosecutor and a deprivation of const1tutional 
guarantees to the ci t1zens, \fe in fact have no cho:'..ce 0 n 
While 1t 1s my privilege,1t 1s not my pleasure to 
write d1ssenting opinions. I would much preter to concur with 
the majority or have them concur 1n opinions prepared by meo 
The preparation of a dissent requires extra effort -- 1t 1s an 
additional burden and one that I choose to avoid whenever 
possible·. But I believe it to be my solemn duty that when the 
-
majority departs from settled rules of law 1n rendering its 
decision. to call attention to the error 1n a dissenting 
opinion in the hope that the error may be corrected by a 
subsequent decision or by the Leg1s1atureo A dissenting opInion 
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also be helpful in cases which are subject to review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The latter court has held 
in accord with my dissent and reversed the Supreme Court of 
California in several cases in recent years. 
I have mentioned only a few of the cases in which I 
-
have disagreed with the majority since I have been a member of 
Supreme Court of California. My dissents cover a wide 
variety of subjects and speak for themselves. They present my 
view on the proposit1ons of law involved in each of the cases 
They are now recorded judicial history. I have no apology to 
offer for any of them, notwithstanding the fact that certain 
isolated statements and phrases have been selected from some of 
them and criticized as being intemperate by some so-called 
eminent authorities. I claim the privilege of using language 
appropriate to the occasIon to express my view and I am not 
disposed to permIt even dean emeritus Roscoe Pound of the 
Harvard Law School to tell me what language I should use when 
depicting the gross injustices which may result from.a majority 
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decision o£ the Supreme Court of California. I might say ri~ht 
here and now that I have failed to find language strong enough 
to g1ve expression to my views in some cases. The language used 
should be equal to the occasion. A decision which 1s only a 
mild departure from settled principles should not be dealt with 
the same as one which outrages Justice and lacks even a 
semblance of reason or common sense to support 1 t. 'When the 
inimitable Franklin Delano Roosevelt depicted the sneak attack 
of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, he declared that that incident 
would "live in in£amy, and when that master of rhetoric and 
oratory, Sir WInston Churchill, referred to those brigands, 
Hitler and Mussollni. who plunged the world into the worst 
holocaust of all time, he used the words "guttersnipe" and 
"jackal. But why belabor the obvious? If the language used 
1s inappropriate it reflects more on the dissenter than on th~ 
majority and its value and effect will be appraised by both 
contemporary observers and posterity. 
Of greater importance than the language used 1n either 
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a majority or dissent1ng opin1on 1s the reasoning or philosophy 
upon which the op1n1on is based -- what rules of law are 
announced -- on which side does justice lie -- or in other 
words, who is right? The answer to th1s question depends upon 
one's pOint of view. I do not claim that I have always been 
right. I may have been wrong many times, but I feel it is my 
duty to the people of California to give them the benef1t of 
my opinIon on all major issues which come before the Supreme 
Court. This I have attempted to do. I claim no credit -- seek 
no accla1m or recognition for what I have done or may do 1n 
the future 1t 1s my job as I see it, and as long as I have 
the physical and mental capacity, I shall continue to perfor~ 
that duty. 
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